A delay tolerant network is a highly constrained networking environment which is low in resources such as memory, bandwidth and battery power. In opportunistic DTNs, nodes cooperatively forward packets for each other through the carry-store-and-forward paradigm. Opportunistic data forwarding can be abused by an adversary by injecting spurious packets in order to waste the resources of the network. To guard against such attacks, it is important to authenticate packets at intermediate nodes. Packet authentication in itself comes with overheads such as computation cost and energy consumption which can be exploited by an attacker to mount a denial of service attack. We propose the use of light-weight DTN-cookies to protect this vital security service from such malicious exploitation. We show through simulations that our proposed mechanisms can improve network performance and save considerable amount of power even in the presence of attackers.
Introduction
Providing security to challenged networks like a DTN requires new techniques. This is heavily influenced by the wireless mode of communication, changing network topology, lack of infrastructure, intermittent connectivity, multi-hop data transfers and limited power budget and resources at nodes [3] , [4] . These challenges become even more aggravated in the presence of adversaries whose primary goal is to prevent the network from fulfilling its functions. Denial of service (DOS) attacks is a threat which affects both wired and wireless networks. The attacker attempts to disrupt or degrade a service provided by an entity or network. A DTN is more vulnerable to DOS due to its unique nature as espoused above.
Common malicious attacks by an adversary include flooding the network with bogus packets, counterfeiting acknowledgements, dropping packets, address spoofing and corrupting routing tables. These attacks have an impact on network connectivity, lifespan of network nodes and overall packet delivery ratio. DOS mitigation techniques which have been proposed and applied in conventional networks will not work in DTN. In light of this, security mechanisms proposed for DTN must take into cognizance its peculiar networking constraints and challenges in addition to its heterogeneous nature. In this paper, we propose mechanisms to detect and react quickly to DOS attacks. We use the ONE Simulator to build the application scenario and show that our resilience mechanisms can counter the effects of DOS attacks and boost network performance, guaranty resource availability and incur low computational and communication overheads. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief overview of DTN security and related work on DOS mitigation. The attacker model, assumptions, and a description of the proposed mechanisms are detailed in Section 3. Section 4 gives an in-depth description of the mobility and routing models, simulation parameters and results. The analysis and evaluation of the results is done in Section 5. In Section 6 we provide conclusions and directions for future work.
DTN Security and Related Work
Standard security protocols like TLS, IPSec have been proven not to work well in Challenged environments like DTN. This is due to a lack of continuous end-to-end connectivity, disruptions, long delays, opportunistic data forwarding and scarcity of resources (memory and CPU) [7] . The bundle security protocol defines four extension blocks to support hop-by-hop and end-to-end authentication, integrity checking and confidentiality [2] In a bid to protect the DTN from resources exploitation, the authors of the BSP specify that every bundle must have a BAB block which must be validated at every hop towards the bundle's destination. The purpose for this requirement is to ensure that resources of the DTN are used solely in forwarding valid and authentic bundles [2] , [13] . This requirement opens a new vulnerability which an attacker can exploit. An attacker can flood the network with small-sized bundles that are BAB-protected. Any unsuspecting security-aware node can waste its resources (CPU and battery) verifying these bogus bundles. The victim node will therefore become a congestion point, run out of battery power and cause partitions in the network. A DOS attack is a threat against availability [5] [1] . Techniques such as the Client puzzle [14] , TCP SYN flood mitigation proposed by Juels and Brainard [15] , the ISAKMP cookie proposed in the PHOTORIS protocol [4] , [16] cannot be directly applied to challenged networks like DTN.
System Model and Design
The primary objective of this work is to strengthen the DTN hop-by-hop authentication process by making it resilient to DOS attacks. A DOS filter mechanism capable of quickly detecting and discarding bogus bundles has been proposed. The proposed mechanism is light-weight, less chatty, hard to forge and robust. Our design takes into account a formal framework proposed by Meadows [17] to tackle network DOS. 
Attacker Model
The computational resource of the attacker is very large. The attacker can compute efficiently pseudo-random functions and MACs in record time but does not possess the network secrets, the attacker is assumed to have the ability to replay, modify, transmit, and receive bundles.
The attacker has the ability to execute the protocol i.e. can compute DTN-cookies and sign bundles, the attacker has the ability to take over a legitimate node and in the process steal keying material and sensitive data. The attacker does not have a global view of the network.
In inter-regional communications, the attacker is assumed to be a rogue router with enormous processing and sending capabilities.
Assumptions
• A node has bounded resources that could possibly be exhausted by a clever attacker
• Trust is established during initial registration of a nodes with the security gateway
• The protocol is between two communicating entities • We assume bi-directional communication asymmetry between a pair of nodes.
• A secure key management mechanism is required for the distribution of nonce seeds and cryptographic secret keys.
A. Intra-Regional DOS Mitigation
A robust and effective DOS defence architecture should have a Detection, Classification and Response element [5] . A generic DTN bundle is made up of the primary block and the payload block. To provide DOSresilience in DTN, we propose a new security extension block called a DTN-COOKIE which adds a light authentication phase and has less computational overheads at the security-aware nodes.
Fig 1. A DTN bundle with security extension blocks
TS: the timestamp which is a concatenation of a bundle creation time and a monotonically increasing sequence number which is unique for every new bundle from a Source Endpoint Identifier (EID) LS: the bundle lifespan or expiration time. The LS value of a bundle can be in minutes, hours or days Src_EID: the Source EID of a bundle, each EID is assumed to be a singleton Dst_EID: the Destination EID i.e. the entity for which the bundle is destined.
RSAwithSHA256: represents the cipher suite M: the bundle payload H (M): h is the hash value derived by passing the payload M through the function H. H is a cryptographic hash function such as MD5, SHA1 or SHA256. We will be using SHA256 as the underlying hash function to the signature and MAC algorithms pubKXi: the public key of node Xi privKXi: the private key of node Xi.
The BSP specification [1] provides minimal protection against DOS attacks. DTN nodes simply drop bundles that fail the authentication and access control checks. We have identified resource exhaustion as a simple means of launching DOS attacks and causing availability problems in DTN. For the intra-regional DOS scenario, we propose three variants of DTN-cookie which can be dynamically chosen based on the perceived Network Threat Level (NTL).
The Initialization Vector (IV) is known only to registered nodes of the region. The IV value is used to seed the pseudo-Random Number Generator (p-RNG); the result is a random long integer value. A concatenation of the timestamp and bundle source EID provides a unique bundle identifier. This unique bundle identifier is concatenated with the random long integer and hashed with H (the SHA-256 algorithm) to produce a fixedlength hash h which is appended to a bundle as DTNcookie. The IV is changed periodically by the regional security gateway to ensure freshness.
DTN-cookie = H ((Timestamp | Src_EIDx) Xor p-RNG (IV)) -v2
The second DTN-cookie variant (v2) is the result when we perform a bit-wise Exclusive-OR operation on Timestamp|Src_EID x and p-RNG (IV). | is the concatenation operator, p-RNG (IV) is the same as in v1. This variant of DTN-cookie has more randomness and provides a stronger DOS solution.
DTN-cookie=HMAC ((Timestamp|Src_EIDx) Xor p-PNG (IV), KRS) -v3
The third DTN-cookie variant (v3) is derived in the same way as v2 with SHA-256 as the underlying hash function. The only difference is that the result of the operation is hashed with a regional secret key K RS to produce a fixed-length MAC which we append to every bundle. The mode of generation of the secret key, the use of p-RNG and bit-wise Exclusive-OR operation inputs more randomness to the DTN-cookie. The secrecy of the IV and the key makes the DTN-cookie hard to forge. These values are changed periodically by the security gateway to prevent compromise and ensure freshness.
When a bundle arrives at a security-aware node, the Bundle Protocol Agent (BPA) examines the bundle to determine if it is a Data or Alert bundle originating from a legitimate source and not expired. Next the BPA tries to determine the perceived Network Threat Level (NTL) associated with the bundle. It does this by looking at the DTN-COOKIE Block. The DTN-COOKIE Block contains the NTL indicator (where Low = 1, Mild = 2, Severe = 3). Based on the NTL indicator, the BPA is able to choose which cipher suite to use to verify the DTNcookie.
The DTN-COOKIE Block has a trailer block with the security result of the DTN-cookie computation as payload. The BPA can also use the Class of Service parameter to deduce the type of bundle it is dealing with by looking into the CoS field in the bundle primary block. Regions are divided into security domains and Network Threat Levels (NTL) is set by GH nodes in each domain making threat response very localised.
Every security-aware node in the DTN maintains a Node Misbehaviour List (NML) and an Alert List (AL). The NML is for recording failed authentication attempts while the AL contains information on blacklisted nodes. Table 1 associates each DTN-cookie variant to a NTL value. This helps security-aware nodes to determine which cookie variant to apply at any point in time. This design makes the solution adaptive to varying threat intensities and save battery power. Egress filtering is used to stop attackers spoofing their addresses to mount an attack. Also we limit the rate at which a node can send packets per connection at any given timeframe to prevent flooding using bogus packets.
Table 1. NTL and Corresponding DTN-Cookie Variants

B.
Inter-Regional DOS Mitigation
It is important to secure the inter-regional segment of DTN communications to ensure availability of services. Disjoint regions can be connected either by a bus, ship, satellite that act as a data mule or relay. In this communication scenario we assume that gateways are powerful workstations with large storage and processing capabilities. To prevent the attacker from spoofing addresses, ingress filtering is enforced at the gateways. Communication between regions is restricted to be gateway-to-gateway. The composition of DTN-cookie used for gateway-to-gateway communication is given below:
The DTN-cookie is same as the v3 used in intra-regional communication. The subtle difference is the use of an inter-regional symmetric key KS.
Simulation Models, Parameters and Results
A. Mobility Models
We use a combination of Map-based and Random Way Point (RWP) movement models [9] 
B. Routing Models
In our simulations we use Epidemic routing [8] which is a replication-based routing protocol which helps us model the worst-case for a flooding-based DOS attack scenario. Other routing DTN routing protocols such as MaxProp [10] , Spray and Wait [11] and Prophet [12] can be used with the proposed mechanisms to achieve an increase in throughput.
C. Results
Evaluation
The proposed solutions require a unidirectional message to achieve message authentication thereby discouraging the roundtrips required in TLS-type of handshake. The DTN-cookies use simple hash functions and symmetric key cryptography which impose less computational complexity during authentication. Symmetric cryptography and hash functions are four orders of magnitude faster than asymmetric cryptography and digital signatures.
The concatenation of the timestamp and source_EID which act as a unique bundle identifier is a strong feature for thwarting replay attacks. The light authentication phase protects security-aware nodes against resource exhaustion attacks which targets battery power and CPU cycles. The Network Threat Level indicators make the proposed solution adaptive to varying intensities of DOS attacks. The use a cryptographically secure random number generator, secret nonces make the proposed mechanisms random and hard to forge. Figure 2 is used to show the computational complexity of the three proposed DTN cookie variants. Using three different simulation runs, we set the NTL values to 1, 2 and 3 respectively (see table1). From this result it is clear that the v1 cookie variant imposes less computational cost overhead on the nodes. The v3 cookie variant is more complex and secure but imposes more battery power overhead on the nodes. Nodes in the three groups have same simulation parameters as shown in table 2. The energy level of nodes is captured at snapshots of 60 seconds interval.
In figure 3 each group is assigned a different NTL value e.g. Group1.Ntl = 1, Group2.Ntl =2 and Group2.Ntl =3. We take snapshots of energy level of each node every 60 seconds. The y-axis shows the average energy level for a typical DTN node during each snapshot interval. From the result, it evident that the v1 cookie variant is less computational expensive when compared to the v2 and v3 variants. The aim of using different cookie variants for different network threat levels is to make the DOS resilience mechanism adaptive and energy efficient. Figure 4 shows the energy gain when light authentication is performed using any of the proposed DTN cookie variants. This result shows that a significant amount of battery power can be saved using our light authentication mechanisms. Signature verification is a computationally expensive cryptographic procedure which requires modular exponentiation.
Conclusions
Denial of Service attacks degrades network service and performance and new methods of attacks are evolving every day. In this paper we presented mechanisms that can proactively protect challenged networks such DTN against flooding-based DOS. We have evaluated the properties of our resilience mechanism and show that our proposed mechanisms are light-weight, hard to forge, less chatty and suitable DTN environments. The simulations show the effectiveness of our cookie mechanisms in combating resource-exhaustion attacks mounted through flooding.
